The required examination and conditions for the issuance of a license are set forth in G.L. c. 90, §8. No license shall be issued to any person under 18.
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A person who is at least 16 years of age may apply for a learner's permit. This permit permits him to drive when accompanied in the front seat by a licensed operator who is 21 or older and has at least one year of driving experience. The learner's permit does not entitle a holder under 18 to drive between 12 a.m. and 5 a.m., unless he is accompanied by his parent or guardian who is a licensed operator with at least one year of driving experience and whose license or right to operate is not revoked or suspended. G.L. c. 90, § 8B.
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A minor who is at least 16 1/2 years old and has met the requirements listed in G.L. c. 90, §8 may obtain a junior operator's license. The holder of a junior operator's license is not permitted to operate a motor vehicle during the first six months of licensure while a person under 18 (other than the operator or his immediate family member) is present in the vehicle unless also accompanied by a duly licensed operator over 21 who has had at least one year of driving experience and is occupying the seat next to the driver. In addition, the holder of a junior operator's license is not permitted to operate a motor vehicle between 12:30 a.m. and 5 a.m. unless accompanied by a parent or guardian. G.L. c. 90, §8.
Effective September 1, 2007, each Junior Operator Applicant must complete a comprehensive Drivers Education Program and 40 hours of Parent or Guardian supervised driving. The applicant must submit a certified statement from the Parent or Guardian certifying that the supervised driving occurred.
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Everyone who registers a motor vehicle in Massachusetts must maintain liability insurance for bodily injury coverage in the minimum amounts of $20,000/$40,000 if the policy took effect on or after January 1, 1993. The amount of uninsured motorist coverage may not be less than the bodily injury minimum limits. G.L. c. 175, §113.
Everyone who registers a motor vehicle in Massachusetts must have Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Insurance. PIP is "no fault" coverage. Every eligible person may have up to a maximum of $8,000 in insurance coverage under PIP. PIP covers reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred within two years of the date of the accident. It also covers 75% of lost wages. Lastly, it covers "replacement services": hiring and paying non-family members to help around the house, where the injured person would have performed the services for free if there had not been an injury. PIP payments for medical expenses are limited to $2,000.00 in cases where such expenses have been or will be paid under a health insurance policy. Shah v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 56 Mass.App.Ct. 903 (2002); G.L. c. 90, § 34A.
Massachusetts law requires that eligible persons coordinate care with available health insurers and the failure to coordinate care may result in the denial of PIP Coverage.
Everyone who registers a motor vehicle in Massachusetts must have a minimum amount of coverage for property damage of $5,000. G.L. c. 90 §34O.
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"In all actions to recover damages for injuries to the person or to property or for the death of a person, arising out of an accident or collision in which a motor vehicle was involved, evidence that at the time of such accident or collision it was registered in the name of the defendant as owner shall be prima facie evidence that it was then being operated by and under the control of a person for whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible, and absence of such responsibility shall be an affirmative defense to be set up in the answer and proved by the defendant." G.L. c. 231, §85A. This also applies to any action to recover for consequential damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident or collision. G.L. c. 231, §85B.
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Generally, in order to prevail on a claim for negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant entrusted a vehicle to an incompetent or unfit person whose incompetence or unfitness was the cause of the victim's injuries; (2) the defendant gave specific or general permission to the operator to drive the vehicle; and (3) the defendant had actual knowledge of the incompetence or unfitness of the operator to drive the vehicle. Mitchell v. Hastings & Koch Enterprises, Inc., 38 Mass.App.Ct. 271, 276-77 (1995). This formulation is called common-law negligent entrustment, and requires actual knowledge of the operator's unfitness by the defendant before liability may be imposed.
In addition, there is also support for a negligent entrustment theory based upon G.L. c. 90, § 12, which provides: "No person shall allow a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be operated by any person who has no legal right to do so, or in violation of this chapter." Mitchell, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 277-278.
Under this theory, a defendant owner may be liable for negligent entrustment if she permits operation of her vehicle by one whose license has been suspended or revoked, regardless of whether she has actual knowledge of that fact.
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The driver's negligence is imputed to the passenger only in those cases where it is established that the driver was the agent or servant of the passenger at the time of the injury, or where it is established that the passenger and driver were engaged in a joint or common enterprise at the time. Thus, in the absence of such a special relationship the passenger may recover against a driver or a third party. Bessey v. Salemme, 302 Mass. 188 (1939).
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It is illegal to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or drugs. A blood alcohol level of .08 or greater is "per se" evidence of intoxication or operating under the influence and is sufficient for conviction. G.L. c. 90, §24.
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By statute, every person operating a motor vehicle involved in an accident in which a person is killed or injured, or in which property damage exceeds one thousand dollars, is required to report such accident to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles on official forms for that purpose. G.L. c. 90, §26.
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Any child who weighs 40 pounds or less or who is less than five years old must be secured by a child passenger restraint (safety seat). G.L. c. 90, §7AA. No person shall operate a motor vehicle or ride in a motor vehicle unless such person is wearing a safety belt. G.L. c. 90, §13A.
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Every operator of or passenger on a motorcycle or motorized bicycle shall wear a helmet, with a suitable retaining device in position, designed and manufactured to protect at least the area of the wearer's head above a reference plane 2.36 inches (60 mm.) above and parallel to a plane defined by the level of the external ear openings and the lower rim of the eye openings. 540 CMR 22.08.
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Standard auto policies limiting the insurer's liability to the lesser of the actual cash value of the automobile, or the cost of repair, are valid. Given v. Commerce Ins. Co., 440 Mass. 207 (2003).
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a. Left turn. When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection of anyways at approximately the same instant, the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right. Any operator intending to turn left, in an intersection, across the path or lane of vehicles approaching from the opposite direction shall, before turning, yield the right-of-way until such time as the left turn can be made with reasonable safety. G.L. c. 89, §8.
b. Speed. A driver's speed may not exceed that which is reasonable and proper, having regard to the traffic and the use of the way and the safety of the public. G.L. c. 90, §17 sets forth various circumstances that constitute prima facie evidence of a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper.
c. Skidding. Mere skidding of a motor vehicle is not evidence of negligence. Mlynarchik v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 3 Mass.App.Ct. 35, 322 N.E.2d 433 (1975).
d. Emergency. In determining whether conduct is negligent toward another, the fact that the actor is confronted with a sudden emergency, which requires rapid decision, is a factor in determining the reasonable character of his choice of action. Newman v. Redstone, 354 Mass. 379, 237 N.E.2d 666 (1968).
e. Mutual forbearance. In Massachusetts, even if the driver of a vehicle has the right of way under G.L. c. 89, §8, the right is by no means absolute. Its possession does not absolve the driver of the duty to exercise due care. The duty requires a driver who has halted at a stop sign to look with reasonable care before entering an intersection and to make efforts to avoid any collision, reasonable in the light of traffic conditions. Canane v. Dandini, 355 Mass. 72, 242 N.E.2d 854 (1968).
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